The Impact of Uncertainty, Threat, and Political Identity on Support for Political Compromise by Haas, Ingrid J
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Political Science Political Science, Department of
2016
The Impact of Uncertainty, Threat, and Political
Identity on Support for Political Compromise
Ingrid J. Haas
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ihaas2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Haas, Ingrid J., "The Impact of Uncertainty, Threat, and Political Identity on Support for Political Compromise" (2016). Faculty
Publications: Political Science. 75.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/75
Everyone in America understands Obamacare is de-
stroying jobs. It is driving up health care costs. It is 
killing health benefits. It is shattering the economy. 
All across the country in all 50 states— … it doesn’t 
matter if you are talking to Republicans or Democrats 
or Independents or Libertarians—Americans under-
stand this thing is not working. 
— Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX, September 24, 2013; 
“Sen. Ted Cruz’s Marathon Speech,” 2013) 
In fall 2013, the U.S. Congress reached an impasse over 
budget negotiations that resulted in a partial government 
shutdown. This inability to compromise was, at least in 
part, driven by conflict between Democrats and Republi-
cans over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA; also referred to as Obamacare). Although the law 
was passed and signed into law on March 23, 2010, and 
upheld by the Supreme Court on June 28, 2012, many 
elected officials in Congress remained critical of the leg-
islation and were pushing to withdraw funding. The views 
of the American public during this time were mixed, with 
around 40% of the public supporting efforts to defund 
the ACA (Blumenthal, 2013). Many Americans expressed 
negative feelings about the law, with more than half ex-
pressing worry and around 30% expressing anger (Con-
nor, 2013). Of interest, however, a majority of Americans 
also expressed some degree of uncertainty and doubt 
about these attitudes (Blumenthal, 2013). So, although 
Senator Cruz (see epigraph) expressed certainty about the 
threat that the ACA posed, public opinion data suggest 
the American public may have been less certain about that 
conclusion. The present work was designed to investigate 
how the affective responses from the public, namely, un-
certainty and threat, contributed to attitudes about Con-
gress and the government shutdown during this period. 
The situation in late 2013 is an excellent example of how 
emotion can impact politics and can be better understood 
in light of social psychological theory. 
Uncertainty, threat, and political behavior 
Social and political psychologists have offered differing 
perspectives on how uncertainty may affect political be-
havior. Political scientists have suggested that familiar 
negative situations (more certain) are more likely to lead 
to aversion and partisanship, whereas unfamiliar situa-
tions (more uncertain) are more likely to lead to anxi-
ety, deliberation, and compromise (e.g., MacKuen, Wolak, 
Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 
2000). However, the effect of uncertainty may not be 
quite so straightforward. Contrary to the view that un-
certainty increases deliberation and compromise, a large 
body of research in social psychology suggests that un-
certainty has the opposite effect. Uncertainty has been 
shown to lead to increased confidence in and dedication 
to one’s prior attitudes, values, moral beliefs, and social 
identity (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; McGregor, 2006; Mc-
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Abstract 
This work examines the impact of uncertainty and threat on support for political compromise. In Study 1, uncertainty, threat, and 
support for compromise were measured. Uncertainty increased support for compromise only when paired with positive or neutral 
affect. Studies 2 and 3 used an experimental design to examine the impact of incidental affect on support for political compromise 
as a function of political identification. Uncertainty was more likely to increase support for compromise in positive or neutral con-
texts and for political moderates and liberals. The combination of uncertainty and threat led conservatives to express reduced sup-
port for compromise. 
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Gregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Proulx & He-
ine, 2008; Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010; Van Den Bos, 
Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van Den Ham, 2005). Al-
though much of the work demonstrating negative out-
comes from uncertainty has examined uncertainty in the 
context of threat, other research in social psychology has 
shown that uncertainty can function differently when at-
tached to positive versus negative emotions. For exam-
ple, Wilson and colleagues have shown that uncertainty 
enhances both positive and negative emotions (Bar-
Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009). 
The purpose of the present research was to investi-
gate the impact of uncertainty and threat on support for 
political compromise, specifically. Past work has estab-
lished a link between threat and decreased willingness 
to compromise (Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013; Maoz & 
McCauley, 2009), but the effect of uncertainty on com-
promise remains unclear. Whereas threat represents the 
potential for harm and is clearly negative in valence, un-
certainty signals a lack of information or confidence and 
must be interpreted in light of the surrounding context 
(Haas, 2012; Haas & Cunningham, 2014). Uncertainty can 
be attached to either negative (e.g., threatening) or posi-
tive (e.g., hopeful) affective states. From this perspective, 
the effect of uncertainty on compromise is likely to differ 
based on the valence (positive or negative) attached to 
that uncertainty. If uncertainty is associated with threat, 
it should be more likely to decrease support for compro-
mise, but if uncertainty is associated with positive affect 
or emotion, it may actually be more likely to increase 
support for compromise. Indeed, work has shown that 
positive emotions with an element of uncertainty, such as 
hope, do have a positive effect on intergroup relations— 
increasing support for compromise in the context of dip-
lomatic relations (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 
2013). When uncertainty is not associated with threat, 
it may be more likely that people consider new sources 
of information as a way to reduce uncertainty. If that is 
the case, uncertainty might also lead people to be will-
ing to accept alternate viewpoints—potentially leading 
to compromise. 
To examine when uncertainty is more likely to lead 
to open- versus closed-mindedness, some of our prior 
work has independently manipulated both uncertainty 
(certain vs. uncertain) and threat (low vs. high) and mea-
sured the impact of these affective states on political tol-
erance (Haas & Cunningham, 2014). Results showed that 
threat moderated the impact of uncertainty on toler-
ance. When participants felt uncertain in a safe or neu-
tral context, uncertainty increased political tolerance. 
However, when participants felt uncertain and threat-
ened, uncertainty decreased political tolerance. The goal 
of the present research was to extend these findings and 
attempt to offer insights as to why compromise about 
the ACA and the budget was so difficult to achieve in 
the fall of 2013. 
Uncertainty, threat, and political ideology 
Recent work in social and political psychology has sug-
gested that political ideology may influence how peo-
ple respond to uncertainty and threat. Much of this work 
has been consistent in arguing that political conservatives 
are more responsive to both uncertainty and threat (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and show a general 
negativity bias (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Shook & 
Fazio, 2009). For example, Jost et al. (2007) examined the 
independent influence of both uncertainty and threat in 
a correlational design, showing that both predicted con-
servative political views. Hibbing and colleagues have pre-
sented individuals with a variety of negatively valenced 
emotional stimuli, finding support for the idea that con-
servatives show greater physiological reactivity to a variety 
of negative stimuli (Oxley et al., 2008; Smith, Oxley, Hib-
bing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011). Some alternative perspec-
tives have been introduced, such as the idea that conser-
vatives may be sensitive to emotionally arousing stimuli, 
regardless of valence. In a recent set of studies, research-
ers found that both positive and negative video clips that 
were highly arousing led to endorsement of conservative 
political views (Tritt, Inzlicht, & Peterson, 2013). Although 
a growing body of work suggests that conservatives and 
liberals may respond differently to emotional or affectively 
laden stimuli, there is ongoing debate about the exact na-
ture of these differences. 
Based on prior work, there is reason to expect that 
conservatives will be responsive to both uncertainty and 
threat. It remains unclear, however, whether conserva-
tives are likely to be more responsive to uncertainty re-
gardless of context, or uncertainty mainly in the context 
of threat. In other words, if we assume that uncertainty 
and threat can be viewed as distinct psychological con-
structs, it is important to understand not just how polit-
ical ideology influences responses to each, but how ide-
ology may influence responses to their interaction. Based 
on work by Jost and colleagues (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et 
al., 2007), we should expect to see conservatives respond-
ing more to both uncertainty and threat independently. If 
conservatives show a general negativity bias (Hibbing et 
al., 2014), we might expect conservatives to respond pri-
marily to threat given that threat is more likely than un-
certainty to be clearly negative in valence. The arousal 
hypothesis (Tritt et al., 2013) might suggest that conser-
vatives would respond to uncertainty regardless of context 
(in both positive and negative situations), but it is worth 
noting that arousal and uncertainty are not necessarily the 
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same thing. Uncertainty could be associated with arousal 
in some contexts, but uncertainty about mundane issues 
or in neutral contexts is less likely to lead to physiologi-
cal arousal. Each of these theories makes different predic-
tions about how political ideology influences responses to 
uncertainty, threat, and the combination of the two. But 
none of these approaches makes a clear prediction about 
how ideology should influence responses to uncertainty 
in different contexts. 
If responses to uncertainty are context dependent, as 
we have suggested in prior work (Haas & Cunningham, 
2014), it may be the case that the combination of un-
certainty with threat is more likely to influence conserva-
tives than uncertainty or threat alone. We have suggested 
that this combination feels especially bad, as it may signal 
some threat in the environment but also a lack of infor-
mation about that threat or how to cope with it. From this 
perspective, one might expect conservatives to be nega-
tively impacted by uncertain threats, specifically. Conser-
vatives may also respond to uncertainty in the absence of 
threat, but given that much of the existing literature has 
looked at uncertainty mainly in the context of threat, this 
is still an open question. 
Overview of current work 
The primary goal of the current work was to investigate 
the impact of uncertainty on support for compromise and 
examine whether threat moderates this effect. A second 
goal was to examine whether these responses to uncer-
tainty and threat differ as a function of political ideol-
ogy—liberal versus conservative. Study 1 uses a correla-
tional design to investigate these processes in the context 
of a real-world political event: the partial U.S. government 
shutdown in October 2013. Studies 2 and 3 use an exper-
imental approach to examine the causal impact of uncer-
tainty on support for compromise as a function of threat, 
political ideology, and ideological extremity. 
Study 1 
In the first study, participants responded to a survey 
measuring uncertainty about the ACA, perceived threat 
related to the ACA, and support for compromise among 
elected officials in Congress. It was expected that un-
certainty would increase support for compromise when 
people felt relatively more neutral or positive toward the 
ACA but uncertainty would decrease support for com-
promise for people who felt threatened by the ACA. In 
this context, it is likely the case that partisan identity also 
played a role, so identity is measured and controlled for 
in the analyses. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 106 undergraduate students from a 
large midwestern university in a conservative state. Data 
collection began October 10, 2013, and stopped when 
the government shutdown ended on October 16, 2013; 
there was no predetermined sample size. Six cases were 
removed due to incomplete data,1 leaving 100 participants 
for analysis (43 male, 56 female, one chose not to report 
gender). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 37 (M = 
20, SD = 2.96). A majority of participants self-identified 
as politically conservative (n = 39) or moderate (n = 44), 
with 15 identifying as liberal and one selecting the “don’t 
know” option. Participants received partial course credit 
for participation. 
Procedure 
Data were collected using web-based survey software 
(i.e., Qualtrics). Participants gave informed consent and 
then completed a survey designed to measure (a) how un-
certain they felt about the ACA, (b) how threatened they 
felt by the ACA, and (c) support for compromise among 
elected officials.2 Measurement order for uncertainty and 
threat was counterbalanced to help control for possible 
order effects. It is important to note that uncertainty and 
threat were measured independently so that it would be 
possible to examine both the main effects of uncertainty 
and threat and their interaction. Additional questions were 
included to measure attention to the news and objective 
political knowledge (in that order). Participants also pro-
vided ideological identification, party identification, and 
demographic information. At the end of the survey, par-
ticipants were debriefed and awarded course credit for 
participation. 
Measures 
Participants were instructed that they would be answer-
ing questions about the new healthcare law and were told 
that this legislation is called the Affordable Care Act and 
has also been referred to as “Obamacare.” These instruc-
tions were explicit to minimize potential differences due 
to knowledge of the law. Public opinion data at the time 
showed that Americans expressed stronger attitudes (in 
both directions) when asked about Obamacare instead of 
the ACA (Goldberg, 2013). 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty was measured with a series of 
questions focused on how certain or uncertain peo-
ple felt about the contents and potential consequences 
of the ACA. These questions were adapted from ques-
tions the Pew Research Center (2013a) had used in the 
weeks leading up to the government shutdown. Par-
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ticipants were asked, “How certain or uncertain do you 
feel about the following aspects of the new healthcare 
law?” in relation to the following items: “the rules and 
regulations it contains,” “how it will affect you person-
ally,” “how it will affect the economy,” and “how well it 
will affect the American people,” rated on a scale from 1 
(very certain) to 6 (very uncertain). Participants also re-
sponded to questions asking how well they understood 
how the law would affect them and their family, rang-
ing 1 (very well), 2 (somewhat well), 3 (not too well), 4 
(not at all well), and 5 (don’t know), and how much in-
formation they had about the law, ranging 1 (none), 2 
(little), 3 (some), and 4 (a lot). 
The information item was reverse scored, such that 
higher values indicated lower levels of information 
(greater uncertainty). “Don’t know” responses were re-
placed with missing data. Then, all six uncertainty items 
were standardized (z scored) and combined into a mean 
score for uncertainty (M = 0, SD = .79). These six items 
showed good reliability so the composite score was used 
for analysis (Cronbach’s α = .88). 
Threat. Threat was measured with questions that focused 
on attitudes and expectations regarding the ACA. Al-
though the uncertainty questions did not measure va-
lence, threat measurement focused specifically on posi-
tive versus negative affect. However, it is worth noting that 
the operationalization of threat was more than just nega-
tive valence; these questions focused on whether people 
thought the law would have negative consequences for 
them or be likely to lead to harm. These questions were 
also adapted from questions used by the Pew Research 
Center (2013a) prior to the shutdown. Specifically, partici-
pants were asked whether they thought the consequences 
of the ACA would be positive or negative for them, their 
families, and the country as a whole (responses ranged 
from 1 [very positive], 4 [not much of an effect], 7 [very 
negative]), whether they thought they would pay more 
or less for health insurance in the future (1 [a lot more], 4 
[about the same], 7 [a lot less]), if the quality of care and 
insurance would become better or worse (1 [much bet-
ter], 4 [about the same], 7 [much worse]), whether the law 
would be good or bad for the economy and the American 
people (1 [very good], 6 [very bad]), and whether they ap-
proved or disapproved of the law overall (1 [strongly ap-
prove], 6 [strongly disapprove]). 
One question (regarding the cost of health insur-
ance) was reverse scored such that higher values indi-
cated an expectation of increased cost (greater threat), 
and responses to these 10 questions were standardized 
(z scored) and combined into a mean score for threat (M 
= 0, SD = .82). These 10 items showed good reliability so 
the composite score was used for analysis (Cronbach’s α 
= .95). 
Support for compromise. To measure support for compro-
mise, the following question was borrowed from the Pew 
Research Center (2013b): “Due to a failure to reach a bud-
get agreement by the end of September, the federal gov-
ernment has currently had to shut down many of its op-
erations until a budget is passed. What would you like 
lawmakers who share your views on this issue to do?” (1 = 
“Stand by their principles, even if that means the govern-
ment shutdown continues”; 2 = “Be more willing to com-
promise, even if that means they pass a budget you dis-
agree with”; 3 = “Don’t know”). “Don’t know” responses (n 
= 12) were omitted for analysis, leaving participants who 
selected “Stand by principles” (n = 22) or “Willing to com-
promise” (n = 66). 
Attention. One item was included to assess how closely 
participants had been following the news related to the 
budget agreement and the government shutdown: 1 
(very closely) to 4 (not at all closely); 5 (don’t know). “Don’t 
know” responses were omitted for analysis. 
Knowledge. Four questions were used to assess how much 
objective or factual knowledge participants had about the 
ACA. First, they were asked what the name of the health-
care law was (1 = Obamacare, 2 = Affordable Care Act, 3 
= Both, 4 = Neither, 5 = Don’t know). This was coded le-
niently; participants received credit if they selected an-
swer choices 1, 2, or 3. The next three questions were bor-
rowed from Pew Research Center (2013a) and focused on 
whether health care exchanges would be available to peo-
ple in that state, if low-income individuals would be eli-
gible for federal subsidies, and if the law required unin-
sured individuals to obtain health insurance. These were, 
again, coded for correctness (the correct answer being yes 
for all three). Each question was coded 0 (incorrect) and 1 
(correct), and these four questions were summed to cre-
ate a composite score for knowledge (scores ranged 0–4; 
M = 2.19, SD = 1.00). 
Political identification. Participants self-identified in re-
sponse to the following item: “In politics today, do you 
consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Indepen-
dent?” (Republican, Democrat, Independent, No preference, 
Other party, Don’t know). If participants selected any op-
tion other than Republican or Democrat, they were di-
rected to a second question that asked them to choose 
which party they identified with more strongly, the Re-
publican Party or the Democratic Party. These two items 
were combined into a dichotomous party identification 
item that included both strong identifiers and “leaners” 
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(coded as 0 [Democrats], 1 [Republicans]). Political ideol-
ogy was measured in a similar fashion (coded as 0 [Lib-
eral], 1 [Conservative]). 
Results 
Uncertainty, threat, and political identification 
Unsurprisingly, Republicans expressed higher levels of 
threat (M = .38, SD = .61) from the ACA than Democrats 
(M = –.88, SD = .52, η2 = .50), as well as higher levels of 
uncertainty (Republicans: M = .12, SD = .80, Democrats: 
M = –.26, SD = .72, η2 = .05).3 However, threat was weakly 
related to uncertainty (r = .11). As shown in Figure 1, par-
ticipants who felt extremely positive or negative about the 
legislation showed lower levels of uncertainty, overall, than 
those who were more ambivalent or neutral in their atti-
tudes. Indeed, an examination of the curvilinear relation-
ship between uncertainty and threat shows a much stron-
ger relationship (r = –.52), suggesting that uncertainty was 
inversely related to attitude strength. 
Although uncertainty was related to party identifica-
tion, these data suggest that the two are not synony-
mous. To determine whether the amount of informa-
tional uncertainty participants expressed was related to 
attention and knowledge about the law, the relationships 
among these variables were examined. Consistent with 
the idea that this measurement of uncertainty did serve 
as a relatively objective measure of informational uncer-
tainty about ACA, participants who said they had been 
following the news related to budget negotiations ex-
pressed less uncertainty about the ACA (r = –.47). People 
who said they were paying attention also showed more 
accurate knowledge about the ACA (r = .39), and greater 
knowledge was related to lower levels of uncertainty (r 
= –.34). Of importance, both attention and knowledge 
were weakly related to threat, suggesting that attention 
and knowledge were not making people feel more posi-
tive or negative overall (both rs <.10). So, although party 
was related to both uncertainty and threat, it seems clear 
that uncertainty and threat are conceptually distinct. The 
influence of uncertainty and threat on support for com-
promise are examined next. Because threat and uncer-
tainty are related to party, party is controlled for in a sub-
sequent model. 
Support for compromise 
The primary hypothesis of interest was that uncertainty 
should increase support for compromise, unless people 
also felt threatened by the ACA. Using the MODPROBE 
Macro in SPSS (Hayes & Matthes, 2009), a logistic regres-
sion model was used to examine the conditional effects 
of uncertainty on support for compromise as a function 
of threat. Overall, uncertainty increased support for com-
promise (b = 1.09, SE = .44), and threat decreased sup-
port for compromise (b = –2.71, SE = .66). These main 
effects were qualified by the predicted interaction, such 
that threat moderated the impact of uncertainty on sup-
port for compromise (b = –1.16, SE = .52).4 The full model 
had a McFadden pseudo R2 value of .38. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, at relatively low or moderate levels of threat (op-
erationalized as more positive or neutral attitudes about 
the ACA), uncertainty increased support for compromise. 
However, at relatively high levels of threat, uncertainty was 
only weakly related to support for compromise. 
Results from the MODPROBE analysis showed that 
the effect of uncertainty on support for compromise was 
strong at mean threat (Zthreat = 0, b = 1.09, SE = .44) and 
when threat was 1 standard deviation below the mean 
(Zthreat = –.84, b = 2.06, SE = .75), indicating more positive 
 
 
Figure 1. Uncertainty and attitudes about the Affordable Care 
Act as a function of political party identification. 
Figure 2. Threat moderates the impact of uncertainty on sup-
port for political compromise. Note. Y axis values are predicted 
probabilities from the logistic regression model. Values for un-
certainty and threat are standardized (z scores) and based on 
observed range of data. Data are plotted at mean threat and ±1 
SD for threat. 
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attitudes toward the ACA. However, at 1 standard devi-
ation above the mean value for threat, the effect of un-
certainty on support for compromise was much weaker 
(Zthreat = .84, b = .12, SE = .45). 
These effects hold when controlling for party identifica-
tion, suggesting that the effects of uncertainty and threat 
cannot be explained through party identification alone. 
The main effects of uncertainty (b = 1.16, SE = .47) and 
threat (b = –2.49, SE = .77) on support for compromise re-
mained relatively strong, as did the interaction (b = –1.19, 
SE = .53). The effect of party identification on support for 
compromise was much weaker (b = –.84, SE = 1.74).5 
Discussion 
Uncertainty, threat, and support for compromise were 
measured during the 2013 government shutdown. Results 
showed that uncertainty increased support for compro-
mise, unless threat was high, in which case uncertainty had 
no impact on support for compromise. Negative attitudes 
about the ACA predicted lower support for compromise, 
overall. It is important that these effects held when con-
trolling for party identification. So, even though both un-
certainty and threat were related to party identification, it 
seems that party identification alone cannot explain these 
differences in support for compromise. 
Whereas Study 1 allowed for an examination of the re-
lationship between uncertainty and support for compro-
mise in the context of an ongoing political event, there 
are some limitations with this type of correlational data. 
Uncertainty and threat were not truly independent here, 
given that uncertainty was related to how strongly posi-
tive or negative attitudes about the ACA were. In contrast 
to many student samples, this sample was largely polit-
ically conservative, making it difficult to examine possi-
ble ideological differences here. I sought to address these 
concerns in Studies 2 and 3, where uncertainty and threat 
were orthogonally manipulated in an experimental design. 
These studies also utilized more diverse samples so that 
it would be possible to examine ideological differences in 
responses to uncertainty and threat. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, uncertainty and threat were manipulated or-
thogonally to examine the impact of these affective states 
on a more general measure of support for compromise. 
These manipulations were not explicitly political in na-
ture, allowing for examination of the role of incidental af-
fect in determining support for political compromise. As 
in the first study, it was expected that uncertainty would 
be more likely to increase support for compromise when 
people were not also feeling threatened. In the threat con-
ditions, it was expected that uncertainty would be more 
likely to reduce support for compromise. In addition, this 
experiment allowed for further examination of the im-
pact of political ideology on responses to uncertainty and 
threat. Given past research, it was expected that political 
conservatives would be more responsive to both uncer-
tainty and threat, and perhaps especially responsive to the 
combination of the two. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 152 workers recruited through Am-
azon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website and 58 under-
graduate students from a large midwestern university. As 
MTurk samples tend to be more liberal (see, e.g., Berin-
sky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012), I also collected data from un-
dergraduate students in a conservative state. Data were 
collected during April 2015. The full sample included 210 
participants (120 male, 89 female, one did not report gen-
der). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 68 (M = 31.7, 
SD = 13.1). A majority of participants self-identified as 
politically liberal (n = 105), with 44 identifying as moder-
ate and 61 identifying as conservative. On a 7-point scale, 
mean ideology was close to the midpoint (M = 3.50, SD 
= 1.67). Participants recruited through MTurk were com-
pensated $1.00, and student participants received partial 
course credit. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four con-
ditions in a 2 (threat vs. control) × 2 (uncertain vs. cer-
tain) between-subjects design. They first completed the 
manipulation, which asked them to read about and imag-
ine a situation designed to elicit the corresponding affec-
tive state and write about how that situation would make 
them feel. Next, participants completed the extended 
version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS-
X; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to serve as a delay 
before the dependent measure (see Haas & Cunning-
ham, 2014). Following completion of the PANAS, partic-
ipants responded to a series of questions designed to 
measure support for political compromise. Finally, they 
provided demographic information, were debriefed and 
thanked for participating. 
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Materials 
Manipulation. To manipulate uncertainty and threat, par-
ticipants were asked to imagine and write about a sce-
nario. These scenarios were borrowed from prior research, 
in which they were used for the same purpose (Haas & 
Cunningham, 2014). In the threatening conditions, partic-
ipants were asked to imagine a home invasion scenario 
in which the culprit is either inside the house (certain) or 
trying to get in (uncertain). In the control conditions, par-
ticipants were asked to imagine someone arriving at their 
home during the day and ringing the doorbell. They are 
told they either know the person (certain) or are unsure 
about who it is (uncertain). Participants read the scenario 
and then provided a written response to the prompt “How 
would this situation make you feel?” 
Support for compromise. Participants responded to three 
questions designed to measure support for political com-
promise (each on an 11-point scale). These questions were 
adapted from questions previously used by the Pew Re-
search Center (2014). The following items show the exact 
question wording: 
1. When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ 
over the most important issues facing the coun-
try, where should things end up? [1 = Obama gets 
everything he wants; 6 = 50/50; 11 = Republicans 
get everything they want] 
2. When Democratic and Republican leaders differ 
over the most important issues facing the coun-
try, where should things end up? [1 = Democrats 
get everything they want; 6 = 50/50; 11 = Repub-
licans get everything they want] 
3. Thinking about elected officials in Washington who 
share your positions on the most important issues 
facing the nation, how do you think they should 
do their jobs? [1 = They should work with elected 
officials they disagree with; 11 = They should stand 
up for their positions no matter what] 
For Items 1 and 2, the theoretical point at which sup-
port for compromise is highest is when participants select 
the midpoint (50/50). Responses to these questions were 
recoded as the absolute value of the difference between 
the response and the midpoint, so the midpoint became 
zero and values higher than zero represented the distance 
from that point. For the third question, lower values repre-
sent greater support for compromise, whereas higher val-
ues represent reduced support for compromise. The reli-
ability for all three items was relatively low (Cronbach’s α 
= .52), mainly because responses to question three were 
not strongly related to responses on Questions 1 and 2. 
So, for analysis, I created a composite measure from the 
first two questions (Cronbach’s α = .83). 
Political identification. Political identification was mea-
sured using a one-item measure asking participants to 
specify their political ideology using the following scale: 
1 (strongly liberal), 2 (liberal), 3 (somewhat liberal), 4 (nei-
ther liberal nor conservative), 5 (somewhat conservative), 
6 (conservative), 7 (strongly conservative). For analysis, this 
item was centered on the theoretical midpoint (4). This 
variable was also squared to create a measure of ideo-
logical extremity. 
Results 
As in Study 1, it was expected that uncertainty would be 
more likely to increase support for compromise in the 
control condition than in the threat condition. Given the 
design of Study 2, support for compromise is also likely 
to be related to political ideology and ideological extrem-
ity. To examine these relationships, I ran a series of mul-
tiple linear regression models (see Table 1). Model 1 in-
cluded political ideology and ideological extremity, Model 
2 added uncertainty, and Model 3 added threat. All possi-
ble interaction terms were included in each model. 
First, I examined the impact of political ideology and 
ideological extremity on support for compromise (see 
Figure 3). As expected, ideological extremity predicted 
support for compromise, such that individuals higher in 
ideological extremity indicated reduced willingness to 
compromise (b = .240, SE = .029). In this sample, overall 
support for compromise was only weakly related to politi-
cal ideology (liberal vs. conservative; b = –.054, SE = .104), 
and there was not much evidence for an interaction be-
tween ideology and extremity (b = .000, SE = .016). 
Table 1. Summary of results from linear regression models in Study 2. 
                                                   Model 1        Model 2         Model 3 
Intercept  .650 (.114)  .801 (.162)  .775 (.223) 
Political ideology  –.054 (.104)  .040 (.149)  .098 (.220) 
Ideological extremity  .240 (.029)  .195 (.039)  .217 (.053) 
Ideology × Extremity  .000 (.016)  –.030 (.022)  –.033 (.032) 
Uncertainty   –.351 (.226)  –.451 (.322) 
Uncertainty × Ideology   –.247 (208)  –.146 (.305) 
Uncertainty × Extremity   .114 (.057)  .099 (.083) 
Uncertainty × Ideology × Extremity  .072 (.032)  .044 (.049) 
Threat    .034 (.332) 
Threat × Ideology    –.157 (.310) 
Threat × Extremity    –.061 (.081) 
Threat × Uncertainty    .208 (.462) 
Threat × Ideology × Extremity    .004 (.045) 
Threat × Ideology × Uncertainty   –.117 (.429) 
Threat × Extremity × Uncertainty   .045 (.118) 
Threat × Ideology × Extremity × Uncertainty  .048 (.066) 
R2  .321  .351  .363 
Adjusted R2  .311  .328  .312 
Values are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in 
parentheses). 
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As shown in Figure 4, when uncertainty was added 
to the model it appears that uncertainty increased sup-
port for compromise among liberals and moderates but 
decreased support for compromise among conserva-
tives. In the second regression model, the three-way 
interaction between political ideology, ideological ex-
tremity, and uncertainty was relatively strong (b = .072, 
SE = .032). 
Parsing the data by threat condition shows that uncer-
tainty was more likely to increase support for compromise 
in the control (no threat) condition (see Figure 5). Of inter-
est, it appears that the effect where uncertainty decreased 
support for compromise (relative to certainty) among con-
servatives was more pronounced in the threat condition. 
In the regression model, the four-way interaction term was 
relatively weak (b = .048, SE = .066). However, if Model 2 
is run separately in both the threat versus no threat con-
ditions, the three-way interaction is stronger in the threat 
condition (b = .091, SE = .045) than in the control condi-
tion (b = .044, SE = .048). 
Examining mean support for compromise by condi-
tion shows that in the full sample, uncertainty increased 
support for compromise (M = 1.28, SD = 1.32) relative to 
certainty (M = 1.44, SD = 1.40) in the control condition. In 
the threat condition, this difference was smaller but still 
in the same direction: Uncertainty led to greater support 
for compromise (M = 1.46, SD = 1.40) than certainty (M 
= 1.53, SD = 1.29). This pattern in the control conditions 
was consistent with expectations, whereas the pattern in 
the threat conditions was not. However, it was expected 
that these effects may differ as a function of political ide-
ology, which is examined next. 
Examining these means as a function of ideology 
showed that this general pattern held for liberal partic-
ipants, but not for conservative participants (see Figure 
6 and Table 2). These means are based on a sample split 
where liberals include anyone who selected 1, 2, or 3 on 
the scale, and conservatives include anyone who selected 
5, 6, or 7 on the scale. Individuals who selected the scale 
midpoint (neither liberal nor conservative) are omitted 
here. For liberals, uncertainty increased support for com-
promise (M = 1.69, SD = 1.41) relative to certainty (M = 
1.90, SD = 1.60) in the control condition. The pattern was 
similar in the threat condition although the difference was 
smaller—uncertainty increased support for compromise 
(M = 1.78, SD = 1.29) relative to certainty (M = 1.93, SD = 
1.35). For conservatives, uncertainty increased support for 
compromise (M = 1.38, SD = 1.45) relative to certainty (M 
= 1.45, SD = 1.15) in the control condition, but not in the 
threat condition. For conservatives in the threat condition, 
uncertainty led to decreased support for compromise (M = 
1.63, SD = 1.75) relative to certainty (M = 1.03, SD = .98). 
In other words, uncertainty did lead to decreased support 
for compromise, but only for conservatives in the threat 
condition. Comparing the means across threat conditions 
suggests that, for conservatives, the uncertain threat con-
dition led to a decrease in support for compromise rela-
tive to uncertain control condition. However, the certain 
threat condition led to an increase in support for compro-
mise relative to the certain control condition. 
Figure 4. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty 
and political ideology in Study 2. Plot represents raw data, but 
x-axis values have been jittered to avoid over plotting. 
Figure 3. Support for compromise as a function of political ide-
ology in Study 2.  Plot represents raw data, but x-axis values have 
been jittered to avoid overplotting. 
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Discussion 
Consistent with the results of Study 1, uncertainty was 
more likely to increase support for compromise when par-
ticipants were not also feeling threatened. This study also 
showed, unsurprisingly, that people who are politically 
moderate are more likely to compromise than those who 
hold extreme political views. Consistent with prior work 
showing that political conservatives may be more sensi-
tive or responsive to uncertainty and threat (e.g., Hibbing 
et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003), Study 2 also suggests that 
individuals high in political conservatism may show a de-
crease in willingness to compromise in response to the 
combination of uncertainty and threat. This pattern of re-
sults is consistent with the view that conservatives are not 
responding negatively to uncertainty regardless of context 
but that the combination of uncertainty and threat is more 
likely to lead to reduced support for compromise. In this 
study, uncertainty did seem to increase support for com-
promise for liberals and moderates in the control condi-
tion, but the control condition here focused on examining 
uncertainty in a relatively neutral context. Given that un-
certainty in Study 1 was paired with either threat or pos-
itive attitudes, it is also important to look at the compar-
ison between threat and positive emotion. 
Figure 5. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty, threat, and political ideology in Study 2. Plot represents raw data, 
but x-axis values have been jittered to avoid overplotting. Higher values on the y axis represent reduced support for compromise. 
Figure 6. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty, threat, and political ideology in Study 2. Plot represents mean sup-
port for compromise by condition. Higher values on the y axis represent reduced support for compromise. Political ideology was di-
chotomized for plotting (moderates removed). 
Table 2. Mean support for compromise by condition and ideology in 
Study 2. 
 Control  Threat 
Liberals 
   Certain  1.90 (1.60)  1.93 (1.35) 
   Uncertain  1.69 (1.41)  1.78 (1.29) 
Conservatives 
   Certain  1.45 (1.14)  1.03 (0.98) 
   Uncertain  1.38 (1.17)  1.63 (1.75) 
Higher values indicate reduced support for compromise. Standard de-
viations are in parentheses. These means are based on data from split-
ting the sample: Liberals here include any participants who selected 1, 2, 
or 3 on the scale, and conservatives include all individuals who selected 
5, 6, or 7. Individuals who selected the midpoint (4) are excluded here. 
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Study 3 
The goals of Study 3 were to replicate the pattern of re-
sults observed in Study 2 and examine the impact of un-
certainty in positive conditions, in addition to the neutral 
and threat conditions used in Study 2. It was expected 
that uncertainty would be more likely to increase support 
for compromise in the positive and neutral conditions but 
more likely to decrease support for compromise in the 
threat conditions. In addition, it was expected that con-
servatives would again be more responsive to the com-
bination of uncertainty and threat, showing reduced sup-
port for compromise in that condition. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 100 workers recruited through Ama-
zon’s MTurk website6 and 243 undergraduate students re-
cruited through a participant pool at a large midwestern 
university in the United States. Data were collected be-
tween November 2015 and February 2016. The full sam-
ple included 343 participants (180 male, 158 female, five 
chose not to identify). Participants ranged in age from 17 
to 67 (M = 23.7, SD = 8.4). A majority of participants self-
identified as politically liberal (n = 155), with 66 identify-
ing as neither and 122 identifying as conservative. On a 
7-point scale, mean ideology was close to the midpoint (M 
= 3.74, SD = 1.74). Participants recruited through MTurk 
were compensated $1.00, and undergraduate student par-
ticipants received partial course credit. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six con-
ditions in a 3 (threat, neutral, positive) × 2 (uncertain, 
certain) between-subjects design. They first completed 
the manipulation, which asked them to read about and 
imagine a situation designed to elicit the corresponding 
affective state and write about how that situation would 
make them feel. These scenarios were modified from 
those used in Study 2 and are detailed next. Second, par-
ticipants completed the PANAS-X (Watson et al., 1988) 
to serve as a delay before the dependent measure. Fol-
lowing completion of the PANAS, participants responded 
to a series of questions designed to measure support 
for political compromise.7 Finally, they provided demo-
graphic information, were debriefed, and were thanked 
for participating. 
Materials 
Manipulation. To manipulate uncertainty and threat, partic-
ipants were asked to imagine and write about a scenario. 
These scenarios were adapted from those used in Study 
2. In the threatening conditions, participants were asked 
to imagine a home invasion scenario in which the culprit 
is either inside the house (certain) or trying to get in (un-
certain). In the control conditions, participants were asked 
to imagine someone arriving at their home during the day 
and ringing the doorbell. They were told they either know 
it is the mailman (certain) or are unsure about who it is 
(uncertain). The control conditions were modified in Study 
3 to make the scenarios more clearly neutral, in contrast to 
the positive conditions that were added for comparison. 
In the positive conditions, participants are asked to imag-
ine that it is their birthday and someone rings the door-
bell. They were told to imagine either that it was their best 
friend arriving for the birthday party (certain) or that they 
are not sure who it is, but it could be a friend arriving for 
their birthday (uncertain). It is important to note that in 
the certain conditions there is always a clear expectation 
about what is currently happening, whereas in the uncer-
tain conditions there is no clear expectancy. Participants 
read the scenario and then provided a written response 
to the prompt: “How would this situation make you feel?” 
Support for compromise. Participants responded to two 
questions designed to measure support for political com-
promise (each on an 11-point scale). These questions were 
the same as the first two questions used in Study 2. The 
third question was omitted here because it did not cor-
relate well with the other two questions in Study 2. As 
in Study 2, these two questions were combined to cre-
ate a composite variable for analysis (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
Higher values represent reduced support for compromise 
on this measure. 
Political identification. Political identification was mea-
sured using a one-item measure asking participants to 
specify their political ideology using the following scale: 
1 (strongly liberal) 2 (liberal), 3 (somewhat liberal), 4 (nei-
ther liberal nor conservative), 5 (somewhat conservative), 
6 (conservative), and 7 (strongly conservative). For analy-
sis, this item was centered on the theoretical midpoint (4). 
This variable was also squared to create a measure of ide-
ological extremity. 
Results 
As in Studies 1 and 2, it was expected that uncertainty 
would be more likely to increase support for compromise 
in the control condition than in the threat condition. In ad-
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dition, Study 3 allowed for comparison of threat with affec-
tively positive conditions. In the positive conditions, it was 
expected that uncertainty would be more likely to increase 
support for compromise. As in Study 2, support for com-
promise is also likely to be related to political ideology and 
ideological extremity. To examine these relationships, I ran 
a series of multiple linear regression models (see Table 3). 
Model 1 included political ideology and ideological extrem-
ity, Model 2 added uncertainty, and Model 3 added threat. 
All possible interaction terms were included in each model. 
First, I examined the impact of political ideology and 
ideological extremity on support for compromise (see 
Figure 7). As expected, ideological extremity predicted 
support for compromise, such that individuals higher in 
ideological extremity indicated reduced willingness to 
compromise (b = .197, SE = .020). In this sample, support 
for compromise was strongly related neither to direction 
of ideological beliefs (liberal vs. conservative; b = .021, SE 
= .074) nor to the interaction of ideology and extremity 
(b = .004, SE = .011). 
As shown in Figure 8, when uncertainty was added to 
the model we can see that uncertainty led to a slight in-
crease support for compromise among liberals and mod-
erates but a slight decrease support for compromise 
among conservatives. Although this pattern looks simi-
lar to that observed in Study 2, it was weaker in Study 3. 
In the second regression model, the three-way interaction 
between political ideology, ideological extremity, and un-
certainty (b = .000, SE = .012) was weaker than that ob-
served in Study 2. There is more evidence for a two-way 
interaction between uncertainty and ideological extremity, 
but again this effect appears to be weaker than in Study 
2 (b = .014, SE = .020). 
Parsing the data by threat condition shows that un-
certainty was more likely to increase support for com-
promise in the positive condition relative to the threat 
condition (see Figure 9). As in Study 2, it appears that the 
effect where uncertainty decreases support for compro-
mise (relative to certainty) among conservatives is more 





















Figure 7. Support for compromise as a function of political ide-
ology in Study 3. Note. Plot represents raw data, but x-axis val-
ues have been jittered to avoid overplotting. 
Figure 8. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty 
and political ideology in Study 3. Plot represents raw data, but 
x-axis values have been jittered to avoid overplotting. 
Table 3. Summary of results from linear regression models in Study 3. 
                                                   Model 1          Model 2         Model 3 
Intercept  .711 (.083)  .713 (.084)  .711 (.085) 
Political ideology  .021 (.074)  .025 (.075)  .026 (.076) 
Ideological extremity  .197 (.020)  .194 (.020)  .195 (.021) 
Ideology × Extremity  .004 (.011)  .003 (.012)  .003 (.012) 
Uncertainty   –.039 (.084)  –.042 (.085) 
Uncertainty × Ideology   .025 (.075)  .029 (.076) 
Uncertainty × Extremity   .014 (.020)  .014 (.021) 
Uncertainty × Ideology × Extremity  .000 (.012)  –.001 (.012) 
Threat    .009 (.104) 
Threat × Ideology   .056 (.094) 
Threat × Extremity    –.002 (.024) 
Threat × Uncertainty    .040 (.104) 
Threat × Ideology × Extremity  –.003 (.014) 
Threat × Ideology × Uncertainty   .033 (.094) 
Threat × Extremity × Uncertainty   –.001 (.024) 
Threat × Ideology × Extremity × Uncertainty  –.005 (.014) 
R2  .227  .229  .232 
Adjusted R2  .220  .212  .197 
Values are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in 
parentheses). 
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model, the four-way interaction term is relatively weak (b 
= –.005, SE = .014). However, if Model 2 is run separately 
in each of the threat conditions, the three-way interaction 
is stronger in the threat condition (b = –.019, SE = .019) 
than in the positive (b = –.007, SE = .020) or neutral (b = 
.019, SE = .023) conditions. 
Examining mean support for compromise by condi-
tion shows that in the full sample, uncertainty did not 
have much impact on support for compromise (M = 1.39, 
SD = .26) relative to certainty (M = 1.34, SD = 1.34) in 
the positive conditions. In the neutral conditions, uncer-
tainty (M = 1.38, SD = 1.19) led to a slight increase in sup-
port for compromise relative to certainty (M = 1.42, SD = 
1.15). In the threat condition, uncertainty led to reduced 
support for compromise (M = 1.22, SD = 1.24) relative to 
certainty (M = 1.11, SD = 1.01). The pattern in the neu-
tral and threat conditions is consistent with what was ex-
pected, but again, the means in the overall sample may 
be influenced by sample characteristics (i.e., political ide-
ology), which I examine next. 
Examining these means as a function of ideology shows 
that for liberals, uncertainty does not seem to have much 
of an impact in any of the three threat conditions (see 
Figure 10 and Table 4). For conservatives, uncertainty did 
not have much impact in the positive or neutral condi-
tions but did impact support for compromise in the threat 
conditions. Under threat, liberals showed no difference in 
support for compromise as a function of uncertainty (M 
= 1.34, SD = 1.30) versus certainty (M = 1.34, SD = 0.74). 
However, for conservatives, uncertain threat (M = 1.67, SD 
= 1.30) decreased support for compromise relative to cer-
tain threat (M = 1.18, SD = 1.34).8 Conservatives showed 
decreased support for compromise in response to the un-
certain threat condition relative to the uncertain positive 
or neutral conditions and increased support for compro-
mise in the certain threat condition relative to the cer-
tain positive or certain neutral conditions. This pattern is 
consistent with what was observed for conservatives in 
Study 2 and suggests that conservatives may be uniquely 
responsive to uncertainty in the threat conditions, given 
that conservatives did not show changes in support for 
compromise in response to uncertainty versus certainty 
in the neutral or positive conditions. 
Figure 10. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty, threat, and political ideology in Study 3. Plot represents mean sup-
port for compromise by condition. Higher values on the y axis represent reduced support for compromise. Political ideology was di-
chotomized for plotting (moderates removed). 
Figure 9. Support for compromise as a function of uncertainty, threat, and political ideology in Study 3. Plot represents raw data, 
but x-axis values have been jittered to avoid over plotting. Higher values on the y axis represent reduced support for compromise. 
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Support for compromise over time 
Given that there were some differences in terms of how 
well the models explained support for compromise in 
Studies 2 and 3, I thought it might be interesting to com-
pare mean levels of support for compromise across sam-
ples. Given that data for Study 3 were collected during 
presidential primary season (in the months leading up to 
the 2016 presidential election), I wondered whether sup-
port for compromise might just be lower overall. Interest-
ingly, this was not the case. If anything, support for com-
promise was a bit higher in Study 3 than in Study 2. On 
the composite measure, participants expressed greater 
support for compromise in Study 3 (M = 1.31, SD = 1.19) 
than in Study 2 (M = 1.42, SD = 1.35). The same pres-
ent was pattern for both questions within the composite 
measure. Participants in Study 3 (M = 1.43, SD = 1.33) ex-
pressed greater support for compromise between Presi-
dent Obama and Republicans than in Study 2 (M = 1.55, 
SD = 1.53). Participants in Study 3 (M = 1.19, SD = 1.28) 
also expressed greater support for compromise between 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress than in Study 2 
(M = 1.32, SD = 1.41). Standard deviations for each mea-
sure were higher in Study 2 than in Study 3, suggesting 
more variance in support for compromise in the earlier 
study. The present work was not designed to address this 
question in detail, but this could be one explanation for 
why the observed effects were weaker in Study 3. 
Discussion 
Study 3 showed similar effects to those observed in Study 
2. Support for compromise was higher overall for political 
moderates relative to those higher in ideological extrem-
ity. Under uncertainty, liberals and moderates were more 
likely to show increased support for compromise, whereas 
conservatives were more likely to show a decrease in sup-
port for compromise. It is important to note that Study 3 
showed the same pattern of results for conservatives as in 
Study 2: Uncertainty only decreased support for compro-
mise when combined with threat. This pattern of results 
is consistent with the view that conservatives are not re-
sponding negatively to uncertainty regardless of context 
but that they are uniquely sensitive to uncertainty versus 
certainty when combined with threat. 
General discussion 
In sum, in three studies uncertainty was more likely to in-
crease support for compromise when people were not 
also feeling threatened. By contrast, uncertainty was more 
likely to decrease support for compromise when paired 
with threat. In the first study, uncertainty and threat were 
measured during the 2013 U.S. government shutdown. 
Uncertainty increased support for compromise among 
people with positive or neutral attitudes about Obam-
acare but was only weakly related to support for compro-
mise among people with negative attitudes about Obam-
acare (those who viewed the legislation as a threat). In a 
second study, uncertainty and threat were orthogonally 
manipulated with inductions of incidental affect (unre-
lated to politics). Again, results were consistent with the 
view that uncertainty was more likely to increase support 
for compromise when people were not feeling threatened. 
Studies 2 and 3 also showed that political conservatives 
were more likely than liberals to show reduced support 
for compromise when exposed to uncertain threat relative 
to certain threat. However, conservatives were not more 
responsive to uncertainty in positive or neutral contexts. 
The present work is consistent with the theoretical 
viewpoint that the effects of uncertainty on social and po-
litical behavior are context dependent (Haas, 2012; Haas & 
Cunningham, 2014). Prior work has shown this to be the 
case when examining the link between uncertainty and 
political tolerance (Haas & Cunningham, 2014), and the 
present work finds similar effects with respect to support 
for compromise. This work helps to clarify when uncer-
tainty is likely to lead to normatively positive versus neg-
ative outcomes and helps to illustrate the importance of 
treating uncertainty and threat as conceptually distinct 
affective states. 
The present work also contributes to our understand-
ing of how individual differences in political ideology in-
fluence responses to uncertainty and threat. Consistent 
with prior work (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007), conser-
vatives were more responsive to uncertainty and threat, 
but this work provides some additional nuance—showing 
that conservatives were especially responsive to the com-
bination of uncertainty with threat. An important note is 
Table 4. Mean support for compromise by condition and ideology in 
Study 2. 
 Positive  Neutral  Threat 
Liberals 
    Certain  1.50 (1.43)  1.56 (1.17)  1.34 (0.74) 
    Uncertain  1.62 (1.08)  1.49 (1.22)  1.34 (1.30) 
Conservatives 
    Certain  1.38 (1.35)  1.54 (1.29)  1.18 (1.34) 
    Uncertain  1.46 (1.38)  1.55 (1.15)  1.67 (1.30) 
Higher values indicate reduced support for compromise. Standard de-
viations are in parentheses. These means are based on data from split-
ting the sample: Liberals here include any participants who selected 1, 2, 
or 3 on the scale, and conservatives include all individuals who selected 
5, 6, or 7. Individuals who selected the midpoint (4) are excluded here. 
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that conservatives did not appear to be more responsive 
to uncertainty in neutral or positive contexts, suggesting 
that they may not necessarily be more sensitive to uncer-
tainty in every situation. The present work is also consis-
tent with the idea that conservatives are more likely to 
show a negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014) but suggests 
that not all negativity is created equal. Conservatives may 
be more likely to respond negatively to threat when that 
threat is uncertain rather than certain. The previous work 
examining the negativity bias has not addressed the is-
sue of uncertainty, so it is unclear to what extent these 
effects may be driven by uncertain threats, specifically, 
rather than threat alone. The present work did not exam-
ine arousal directly, but based on the arousal hypothesis 
(Tritt et al., 2013) one might expect conservatives to re-
spond more strongly to uncertainty in any situation (as-
suming uncertainty leads to arousal, which may not always 
be the case). This is not consistent with the present work: 
Conservatives here were less likely than liberals to respond 
to uncertainty in neutral or positive contexts. Future work 
will also need to address the extent to which arousal and 
uncertainty are related and are likely to lead to similar or 
distinct behavioral outcomes. Although existing research 
has begun to examine the differences in affective process-
ing that may underlie or contribute to political beliefs, the 
present work shows that we still have more work to do in 
terms of understanding how uncertainty influences polit-
ical behavior in different contexts and in understanding 
how uncertainty influences responses to threat. In addi-
tion, much of the previous work has focused on differ-
ences in sensitivity to uncertainty or threat but has ne-
glected to examine downstream behavioral consequences 
of that sensitivity. The present work shows that under-
standing ideological differences in how people respond 
to emotional or affective states can also help to improve 
our understanding of political behavior. 
There is value to examining questions about how emo-
tion influences politics in real-world contexts. The effects 
of uncertainty and threat observed in Study 1 were stron-
ger than those observed in Studies 2 and 3. The correla-
tional study captured emotion in relation to a real-world 
event, whereas the experimental designs used in Stud-
ies 2 and 3 relied on laboratory manipulations of inci-
dental affect. One limitation of Study 1 is that threat level 
was somewhat confounded with party identification, given 
that Republicans held more negative attitudes toward the 
ACA. Using the experimental approach in Studies 2 and 3 
allowed for examination of ideological differences in an 
experimental context where uncertainty was more clearly 
separated from threat, but future work should also exam-
ine whether there are real-world situations in which lib-
erals feel more threatened by policy decisions and show 
equally low support for compromise. It is worth examining 
how liberals respond to uncertainty when placed in situ-
ations where they feel directly threatened by policy deci-
sions. Regardless, the present work shows that although 
ideology certainly has an impact, support for compromise 
is not driven entirely by party allegiance—uncertainty and 
emotion play a crucial role. 
This has implications for how we think about politi-
cal debates and conflict. It may not be the case that any 
amount of uncertainty is problematic for political dis-
course. In fact, moderate levels of uncertainty may actu-
ally encourage people to seek out additional information 
or be willing to engage in deliberation with the opposing 
side. To encourage compromise, cooperation, and other 
normatively desirable outcomes, it may be most impor-
tant to minimize the perception of threat. 
Notes 
1. In 100% of these cases, participants started the survey multi-
ple times but completed the survey only once, so removal of 
incomplete data does not indicate attrition (all participants 
remain in the data set). 
2. These were the primary independent and dependent vari-
ables of interest. Additional items were included to gauge 
blame, personal relevance, and perceptions of polarization, 
but these variables are outside the primary scope of this ar-
ticle and are not discussed here. 
3. If political ideology is substituted for political party identifica-
tion here, there is still a sizeable difference on threat (Con-
servative: M = .37, SD = .62; Liberal: M = –.63, SD = .70, η2 = 
.35), but no difference for uncertainty (Conservative: M = .00, 
SD = .79; Liberal: M = .02, SD = .81, η2 = .00). 
4. Although uncertainty is related to knowledge, the effects of 
uncertainty on support for compromise cannot be explained 
by substituting knowledge for uncertainty in the model. In 
an alternate model where knowledge and the Knowledge × 
Threat interaction were included, knowledge had no real ef-
fect on support for compromise (b = .27, SE = .45) and there 
was no interaction of Knowledge × Threat on support for 
compromise (b = .40, SE = .55). 
5. When party identification is recoded as a continuous vari-
able (1 = Democrat, 2 = Lean Democrat, 3 = Lean Republi-
can, 4 = Republican) and included as a covariate, the effects 
are similar and the interaction is still strong (b = –1.54, SE = 
.62). The results are similar when political ideology is sub-
stituted for political party identification. The main effects of 
uncertainty (b = 1.05, SE = .43) and threat (b = –2.68, SE = 
.74) on support for compromise remain relatively strong, as 
does the interaction (b = –1.16, SE = .52). The effect of po-
litical ideology on support for compromise is much weaker 
(b = –.26, SE = 1.09). 
6. One participant was excluded from the MTurk sample for fail-
ing to complete the manipulation (typed random characters 
rather than full sentences). 
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7. Participants also completed two measures of political toler-
ance after the compromise measure, but these are beyond 
the scope of this article and are not discussed here. 
8. As in Study 2, these means are based on a sample split where 
liberals include anyone who selected 1, 2, or 3 on the scale 
and conservatives include anyone who selected 5, 6, or 7 on 
the scale. Individuals who selected the scale midpoint (nei-
ther liberal nor conservative) are omitted here.    
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